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Introduction 
 
Effective public management is much more than the application of technical 
measures and techniques.  Government has a larger role in the societies of 
OECD/EU countries than it did two decades ago and must develop the appropriate 
capacities and methods to deal with complex policy problems and an inter-
connected international system. This requires a well functioning public 
administration with the ability to enhance policy capacity through strategic choices 
and optimal resource use, in tandem with an administrative capacity to manage and 
implement the agenda. These administrative/management arrangements are 
inextricably linked to the fundamental institutions of public governance which 
provide stability and characterise the polity.  In the case of Ireland much has 
changed in the past 30 years.  Public institutions have experienced adaptational 
pressures as a result of economic and social modernisation and increasing 
integration into the European and global economy.  As is evident in other states, a 
reform agenda has been promoted to enhance the public sector’s capacity to 
mediate and drive these changes and facilitate development.   
 
This paper aims to explore the capacities of the Irish central bureaucracy in its role 
as a nexus between political leadership and external socio-economic forces. The 
achievements and trials of public sector reform will be emphasised as sustained 
reform is considered imperative given the contemporary states’ challenges arising 
from the global financial crisis and collapse in the national public finances. Using 
institutional theory the discussion will explore the development of the state 
bureaucracy and role of the civil service in four distinct periods - the early decades 
Abstract 
Ireland is no different to other EU/OECD countries whereby 
ongoing reform is pursued in order to enhance the public sector’s 
capacity to deal with expanding policy competences, societal 
change and the demands of an international environment.  The 
current fiscal crisis is the backdrop for a presentation of past and 
present reform initiatives in Irish public administration.  The 
discussion utilises the conceptual lenses of longitudinal 
(historical) and normative (sociological) institutional approaches.  
It charts the development of the state bureaucracy and role of 
the civil service in four distinct periods - the early decades of 
independence, fiscal rectitude in the 1980s, the boom of the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ and the impact of the fiscal crisis in 2009.  
Contemporary reform initiatives to promote the strategic capacity 
of the civil service will be considered in view of the critical 
importance of public sector reform for the return of economic 
competitiveness and a restoration of the public finances.  It is 
argued that current reforms have modernised the civil service 
but have been of a largely technical nature and the ‘path 
dependency’ of specific institutional characteristics endures. 
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of independence, fiscal rectitude in the 1980s, the boom of the Celtic Tiger and the 
current severe economic and fiscal situation. The historical influence of institutions 
is both acute and subtle since institutions comprise the norms and conventions of 
behaviour, as well as constituting the formal apparatus of government.  The current 
reform initiatives to promote the strategic capacity of the civil service and a whole 
of public service perspective will be considered in view of the critical importance of 
public sector reform in the restoration of economic competitiveness. It is argued 
that current reforms have modernised the civil service but have been of a largely 
technical nature and the ‘path dependency’ of specific institutional characteristics 
endures. 
 
 
Contextualising the reform of the public sector 
 
Ireland is a sovereign state on the periphery of Europe but its population is only 
two-thirds of metropolitan Boston (Krugman and Venables, 1995).  Despite its size 
and geographical location, politicians, diplomats and policy-makers have long 
considered Ireland’s economic and political development in the 1990s as an 
unparalleled success story, with the State ranked as one of the top performing 
economies in Europe.  This turnaround and contrast to the economic crisis of the 
1980s has focused attention on the developmental role of the Irish state and 
stimulated debate on the capacity of the active state to address sustainability. 
Amongst the discourse surrounding this is the view that the economic progress of 
the Celtic Tiger largely put the profitability of multinational companies before the 
needs of citizens and lacked stimulation of sufficient indigenous development, thus 
not fostering sustainability.  Such views are reinforced by comments that the 
promotion of a competition state has materialised which prioritise goals of 
economic competitiveness rather than social cohesion and welfare (Kirby and 
Murphy, 2008; Kirby, 2002). In late 2007, however, domestic economic growth 
faltered in the light of escalating energy prices, a downturn in global markets and a 
drop-off in domestic consumption and production. Since then tax receipts have 
fallen drastically and borrowing requirements significantly increased.  The Irish 
State’s vulnerability as a small open economy was evident in the global financial 
crisis in 2008. The reverberations felt by both the global credit crunch and a 
domestic housing bubble collapse, however, arguably obscured the fact that before 
the acute crises of 2008 the Irish economy was already in difficulty. A looser rein on 
public finances and a spiralling loss of competitiveness, the origins of which were 
apparent from the late 1990s, threatened its position as premier European host to 
inward direct investment. A disproportionate dependency on the construction 
industry and property sector characterised development. From 2003 in particular, 
the close correlation between credit expansion in the economy generally and house 
price inflation suggested that property price movements were increasingly driven 
by banks’ lending practices rather than the state of the “real” economy. This became 
all too apparent during the dramatic fall-out in autumn 2008 and an unprecedented 
decline in GDP. During 2009 the deep fiscal crisis resonated with Ireland’s 
profound fiscal struggles in the 1980s, a situation worsened by recession in the 
Eurozone and globally. What distinguishes the current predicament is that “the 
fiscal systems second crisis since the foundation of the state has coincided with the 
 
RETICENT OR ROBUST REFORM? 
BERNADETTE CONNAUGHTON 
 
3 
 
banking system’s first” (McCarthy, 2009:1). Drawing direct parallels with the 
experience of Ireland’s fiscal crisis in the 1980s are, however, deemed to be of 
limited value given the quite different circumstances. It is also asserted that fiscal 
consolidation in the post 1987 period was less daunting than is likely to be the case 
over the coming years (ibid).  
 
Effective public management or the “art of the state” (see Hood, 1998) is 
fundamental to the state achieving its ambitions – economic, environmental and 
social. In international comparisons the quality and efficiency of the Irish public 
administration ranks relatively well in a cluster of OECD states (Social and Cultural 
Planning Office, 2004; OECD, 2008). It is acknowledged, however, that the state of 
the art of comparison has not developed to a stage where clear judgements can be 
made (Boyle, 2007).  From the outset the Irish State had a strong civil service and 
education system, as well as a functional democratic system with many of the 
structures and institutions inherited from Britain in 1922, thus ensuring continuity. 
For example, it is recorded that 20,415 officials, comprising 98% of what became the 
civil service of the Irish Free State, transferred from the service of the UK to the 
service of the Provisional Government (Fanning, 2007:9). Regarding positive 
developments, the Irish public service has contributed historically to a number of 
major economic and political achievements. These include the consolidation of the 
institutions and social services of an independent democratic state; economic 
development reforms; the negotiation of EEC entry and the sustaining of EU 
membership; the Northern Ireland peace process and since 1987, economic 
recovery, social partnership and the Celtic Tiger era.  The institution of public 
service has, however, also been heavily criticized for a lack of innovation given its 
inability to stem the prolonged economic stagnation up to the 1950s, Ireland’s 
comparatively poor economic performance over 50 years up to the mid-1980s (Lee, 
1989), and more recently the failure to effectively control expenditure. Arguably the 
hike in public sector spending since the late 1990s has not been sufficiently tied to 
the elimination of many inefficient working practices, the concrete delivery of value 
for money in effective public service delivery, or significant innovation, regardless 
of the rhetoric of reform.   
 
Despite this there is a general view that overall the institution of the public sector 
has served the State well (Callanan, 2007; Dooney and O’Toole, 1998).  However, 
ironically in the midst of the financial crisis (bringing into focus the irresponsibility 
of bankers and developers), the public sector has been subject to criticism, and 
assertions that the crisis has revealed significant weaknesses in the political system 
(Hardiman, 2009). The domestic failure in expenditure control and the deficient 
oversight of the private banking system by public regulators sparked a 
controversial debate fuelled by the media about efficiency and capability within the 
public sector. Its performance is perceived as both a contributory symptom and a 
necessary solution to current economic maladies.  It may be argued that 
internationally a new public/private paradigm is emerging with the return of the 
state to a more direct regulatory role.  During the late-1980s and 1990s the private 
sector model of management, corporate governance practices, and flexible modes of 
regulation (as opposed to ‘red tape’) were actively promoted as a prescription for 
public sector efficiency and cultivating enterprise. In the past decade the high 
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profile collapses of corporations such as Enron, MCI Inc and more currently the 
operation of the banking sector, highlight profound governance failures and 
illustrate a ‘bankruptcy’ in the application of these principles. This raises a new set 
of questions in the debate on private sector type management versus public sector 
type management. Drechsler and Kattel note that “the period of history we are now 
entering, and this goes for the next 20-30 years, is bound to be much more state 
friendly than the 1990s [as we ask ourselves] how to govern or steer a complex 
innovation based society” (2008:97).  The potential of a new paradigm spotlights the 
capacities of the Irish bureaucracy to assist the political leadership and participate 
effectively in those challenges, both in terms of policy and administrative capacities. 
The following section outlines a framework of questions with reference to 
institutional theory and perceptions of developments in comparative public 
management which will underpin the subsequent discussion of Ireland’s public 
sector reform experience.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Theoretical framework – institutionalism and public management 
 
Institutions are frameworks that structure choices by providing appropriate 
routines and standard operating procedures (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991; March 
and Olsen, 1989).  They embody cultures and past political decisions, hence 
influencing how political-administrative actors exercise their current decision-
making. For institutionalists the institutional organisation of the polity on the 
political economy is seen as the principal factor structuring collective behaviour and 
generating distinctive outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996).  Since the study of public 
administration has traditionally focussed on the structures of government and the 
pursuit of governing public affairs, it is assumed that the significance of institutions 
is consciously and subconsciously guaranteed. ‘Old’ institutional approaches 
tended to concentrate on the importance of rules and laws as a means to shape 
public sector organisations and their conformity to the norms and values that 
underpin democratic accountability and public service. This is reflected in the 
normative debates of Wilson (1887) and Weber (1922). This perception of 
institutionalism can be regarded as having an uneasy relationship with newer 
governance approaches. For example, new public management ideas, contracting-
out and the emergence of steering through networks have challenged institutional 
approaches to the investigation and practice of public administration and departed 
from the traditional paradigm.  
 
The 1980s era marking the departure from the traditional model and the subsequent 
coining of the term new public management (NPM), however, also coincides with a 
re-discovery of institutions as independent variables.  Theorists departed from the 
static institutionalist explanations and advocated how institutions may affect 
change, lack of change, or even individual actor’s strategies and how they want to 
achieve their goals. This resulted in diversity in the explanations of how interests 
and goals themselves are moulded and re-moulded. These further explanations of 
how institutions shape behaviour do not conform to one body of thought. There are 
three approaches to ‘new’ institutionalism, namely historical, rational choice and 
sociological. Rational choice accounts (less central to the discussions in this paper) 
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consider preference formation as exogenous whereas other institutionalist theorists 
consider that interests are endogenously forged (Peters, 2005; March and Olsen, 
1989). These new institutionalist approaches accept that there is a variety of 
influences on public policy in terms of the roles that public institutions play in 
shaping and determining social and political outcomes. The three variants are 
distinct in their ontological understanding of human behaviour – either calculus or 
culture led (Hall and Taylor, 1996) – and hence the logic behind change.   
 
The most basic assumption that holds these three approaches together is that 
institutions have a structuring effect on political actions and outcomes (Aspinwall 
and Schneider 2000). Rational choice or actor-centred institutionalism focuses on 
strategic, goal oriented behaviour within institutional limits, conforming to a 
refined version of rational choice theory.  In contrast historical institutionalism 
stresses the resilience of national policies and institutions against outside pressures. 
The hypothesis tested by historical institutionalism is that the current outcomes of 
public decisions do not reflect the mere preferences or interests of contemporary 
actors. Rather they are channelled by the existing and past institutional 
arrangements, whereby public policy choices made in the past shape choices forged 
today.  These arrangements are said to be very deeply rooted in national history. It 
is the sense of permanence that makes the institutions legitimate in the eyes of 
national actors (March and Olsen, 1989). Political actors’ disagreement with the 
prevailing policies of the institutions is crucial for change (Peters et al, 2005) since 
this account argues there will be clear expectations concerning the scope and mode 
of change. It is only in exceptional cases of fundamental performance crises or 
external shocks that the discrepancy between exogenous pressure and actors’ 
adaptive capacity and self-reinforcing feedback gives way from the path of 
continuity or ‘path dependency’. As a result of these ‘critical junctures’ a new path 
emerges for actors to adapt their behaviour and choice, becoming ‘locked in’ to a 
new set of continuities and compliant behaviour. 
 
Sociological institutionalists suppose that individual behaviour is led by duties and 
obligations (March and Olsen 1989). Institutions provide standards of obligation 
which help individuals in assessing which course of action is expected from them in 
a particular situation. “Individuals face choices all the time, but in doing so they 
seek guidance from the experiences of others in comparable situations and by 
reference to standards of obligation” (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991: 10). 
Organisations seek to be successful by adhering to cultural norms that are 
commonly perceived to be appropriate and legitimate (Peters, 2005). The core 
notion of sociological institutionalism is that life is organised by relatively stable 
sets of shared meanings and practices. Institutions are defined as practices, 
administrative rituals, symbols - a definition that is broader than the rationalist 
focus on formal rules and the technical requirements of the task at hand. These rules 
are followed because they are seen as ‘logic of appropriateness’ that is natural, 
rightful, expected, and legitimate. The sociological perspective focuses heavily on 
the importance of learning as a means of bringing about the change which allows 
institutions “to identify and then adapt to changing circumstances in their 
environment” even though such changing circumstances may also be seen as a 
threat to its “established pattern of behaviour” (Peters, 2005: 35). 
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Taking the maxims of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
into account, the alterations to the nature of state bureaucracy prompted by NPM 
reform prescriptions and governance approaches need to be considered.  NPM has 
strived to replace formal relationships and laws with ones based on budgets and 
market mechanisms.  Institutional change is reflected in the reduced emphasis on 
input processes and control but also in a shift towards a perceived concentration on 
monitoring and evaluation using performance indicators.  A changing role of the 
state is heralded since bureaucracy and markets are opposing forms of organisation: 
bureaucracy relies on force and markets rely on choice (Ostrom, 1989).  However, 
while there is much that is new in contemporary governance, it is also true that 
many developments in public management approaches may not be original so 
much as adaptations of old institutions to new circumstances (Lynn, 2006:108).   
 
Such sentiments are acknowledged by Christensen and Laegreid (2001) who argue 
that identity changing reforms may be implemented in the public sector but only in 
a “highly history path dependent and distorted way” (Christensen and Laegreid 
2001: 14-16). They differentiate between the ‘supermarket state’ and the ‘sovereign 
state’ model. The former attends to economic values and norms meaning that other 
values and considerations from the centralised state model will be downgraded i.e. 
economic factors dominate the public sector. Whereas the latter conforms to a 
centralised state with a large public sector in which standardisation and equality are 
prominent features. The authors acknowledge that neither sovereign state or 
supermarket model are fully embraced holistically in their reforms but are rather 
blended and synthesized. Lynn (2006) argues that utilising NPM as a general brand 
and explanation of change has distorted understandings of adaptation, change and 
reform in public institutions. He cites the comparative work of Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004) who argue that there has been a tendency to use the generic ‘rhetoric of 
reform’ to exaggerate similarity whereas in fact the results are rather mixed. Pollitt 
and Bouckaert illustrate their own variant of models of adaptation to reform in their 
distinction between countries reflecting more intense ‘NPM’ marketisation and 
those conforming to ‘Neo-Weberian’ preservation of the idea of public service and 
reaffirmation of the state (2004:96-100). These labels are further differentiated into 
maintainers, modernisers, marketisers and minimal state.  Secondly, there has also 
been a tendency to neglect transformations in administrative institutions, notably 
devolution and deconcentration (see Toonen, 2003) which have considerable 
consequences. Finally, Lynn comments that as an outcome of these distortions, “the 
path dependence of change - the fundamental continuity of administrative 
institutions - has been obscured, with the resulting loss of insight into the change 
process itself and the future prospects for reform” (2006:108).   
 
A central goal of this paper is to try and understand the insights into change 
processes and public management reform outcomes in the Irish case through 
longitudinal (historical) and normative (sociological) approaches.  
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The following questions will be examined. 
1. What are the building blocks of the national and organisational public 
service norms and culture? Is there a particular ‘logic of appropriateness’? 
2. What decisions were taken at the formation of the state and what long term 
impact has this had on institutions?   
3. What implications have these historical / normative developments had on 
the development of the public sector, reform and its implementation? 
4. Which brand or public management model does Ireland conform to - New 
Public Management (NPM) / Neo-Weberian State (NWS), Supermarket / 
Sovereign state? 
 
 
Mediating forces shaping the political-administrative institutions 
 
In order to understand historical and normative institutionalist accounts in the Irish 
context it is important to reflect on how Irish political culture and the institutional 
framework has been shaped as a result of social, political and economic processes. 
Small states like Ireland are usually compared to their closest neighbour and as a 
result of colonial heritage Ireland had a relatively modernised society upon 
independence in 1922. It has been argued that the new Irish State had many positive 
attributes with good physical infrastructure, a recently overhauled civil service 
machine, the imposition of early welfare measures by the British parliament and a 
fair standard of elementary education (Garvin, 2004: 2).  The desire for Irish 
independence building in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries was founded on 
both political and cultural nationalism.  It was a prevailing belief that being Irish 
was irreconcilable with being ruled from England and that sovereignty was 
necessary to underpin Irish identity.  However, despite this and a political mood in 
1922 reflecting distance from Britain, it was never in doubt that the Free State would 
adopt a form of representative parliamentary government since the experience of 
Westminster politics and administration had deep roots in Ireland (MacCarthaigh, 
2005: 63).1   
 
Ireland was a direct beneficiary of the Northcote-Trevelyan modernising reforms as 
they emerged in practice in the early 20th Century. In addition the Constitution 
(both 1922 and 1937) explicitly included the principle of cabinet responsibility. The 
officials who transferred to the new Irish civil service were steeped in the British 
tradition and features of this tradition such as merit and political impartiality 
endured since there was no infusion of political appointees. The elite did not deem 
it necessary to create new administrative machinery despite the break in 
constitutional tradition. The continuity rather than change did not occur in the 
absence of a cultural imprint. The ‘greening’ of the civil service had gradually 
developed as a consequence of open recruitment for lower civil service grades from 
                                                        
1 In 1937 the constitution of the Irish Free State (1922) was replaced by the current constitution Bunreacht na 
hĒireann. Its main features included an emphasis on the republican and unitary nature of the state, a bicameral 
legislature - the Oireachtas composed of an upper house, Seanad Éireann,  and a lower house, Dáil Eireann, 
together with the government and independent court system.  Their structure and operation were consciously 
modeled on the British institutional framework.  The head of government in Ireland is the Taoiseach and the head of 
state is the President who is elected by the people every seven years.  
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1870 and a discriminatory policy of promoting civil servants with a nationalist 
persuasion. Political appointees had resigned or been dismissed during the 
revolutionary period.   
 
Hence while political independence did not constitute any overt administrative 
problem, Ireland’s development as a state saw the emergence of a distinctive 
political culture characterised by a strong belief in democracy and public allegiance 
to the political system, as well as traits such as paternalism, clientelism, 
personalism, authoritarianism, and contradictory trends of centralism and localism 
(see Hayward and MacCarthaigh, 2007).  Perhaps the strongest influence on 
Ireland’s societal culture and identity was the Catholic Church. This was also a 
legacy of British government in Ireland as partnerships had developed between the 
church and the British state whereby religious organisations undertook the 
provision and delivery of many social services (Garvin, 2004).  The Church 
subsequently influenced the behaviour of individuals, instilled a sense of 
community, continued to issue pronouncements on social issues and played a 
dominant role in policy-making and resource allocation in the fledgling state for 
several decades (Connaughton and Quinn, 2010; Chubb, 1992). The 1937 
Constitution of Ireland that replaced the negotiated Free State constitution of 1922 
was a deliberate attempt to integrate Catholic social teaching into the liberal 
democratic tradition inherited from Britain.  
 
It is also asserted that the developing political culture understood democratic 
politics if not always possessing a complete understanding of democratic 
government. As Garvin (2004: 3) notes “the unresponsive, patronising and often 
bullying character of British rule had left bad Irish habits, particularly a persistent 
popular tradition of being ‘agin the government’.” Political reform was required to 
restore faith in democracy. A deliberately strong central executive contrasted with 
the erosion of the autonomy of local government.  The new Irish state moved 
swiftly to curtail the powers of local authorities in an alleged sacrifice of democracy 
to combat anarchy and eliminate corruption. Crucially, a high level of tax 
centralisation made local government weak and dependent on the government 
departments for resources. This centralisation was further accentuated by the 
copper fastening of what Fanning (2007: 10) describes as the “fundamental 
principles” of the British financial system/role of the Treasury and their emulation 
by the Department of Finance. In the Cosgrave administration the Minister of 
Finance was also head of government which afforded immense advantages to the 
senior officials seeking to root the British legacy since the general civil service 
organisation and regulation was vested in the Department. Other indigenous 
recalibrations of institutional features included the Civil Service Commission in 
1924 and the Local Appointments Commission in 1926 which embraced the 
meritocratic ethos. British legacy was also apparent in the generalist pattern of 
recruitment that enshrined a “cult of the amateur” within the service (Lee, 1989: 93). 
These reforms, however, established the long term values of a professionalised and 
competent civil service rather than patronage in spite of a background of divisive 
civil war.  
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The Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 became the legal basis for the civil service and 
this exacerbated the characteristics of centralisation and control.  The minister in 
charge of each department was designated a 'corporation sole', whereby the 
minister would essentially be the department and the acts of the department would 
be the acts of the minister for which he/she would be responsible to the Dáil. From 
a legal point of view, the civil service played a subservient role, thus parliamentary 
control of the civil service developed as indirect in nature, occurring through the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the government. The structural features of 
the electoral system, however, did not contribute to fostering a professional cadre of 
political policy makers. The multi-seat single transferable vote proportional 
representation system (PRSTV) produced national politicians who were 
significantly preoccupied with local electoral survival, arguably to the detriment of 
national policy. This reinforced bureaucratic continuity since senior civil servants 
served essentially inexperienced governments and ministers which were reliant on 
their expertise. Hence, another maxim of British civil service, that of ‘clear sight 
over short distances’ also became a hallmark of the Irish administration (Barrington, 
1980:31). The parliament (Oireachtas) developed along a trajectory that mirrored the 
demise of the legislature in other liberal democracies. Its oversight mechanisms 
were weak and legislators were predominantly resident in their constituencies 
undertaking constituency work.   
 
Continuity of personnel and structure was mirrored by continuity of procedure and 
the relationship that developed between politicians and civil service had the effect 
of enabling the public service to be largely its own keeper with respect to reform.  
From the beginning policy making became marked by incremental adaptation and 
this was illustrated in the expansion and adaptation of the institutional framework 
for modernisation.  The new Irish State encountered serious infrastructural deficits 
and introduced commercial and non-commercial state sponsored bodies (SSBs) as 
instruments for development.2  The first major commercial public enterprise 
development commenced with the establishment of the Electricity Supply Board 
(ESB) in 1927.  It was asserted that the rigidity of the civil service system was 
considered unsuitable for the running of such commercial operations (Dooney and 
O’Toole, 1998).  Their organisation took the form of ministers being placed at one 
remove from these bodies, namely that ministers were responsible for policy but 
not for the detail of operations.  Although established for practical reasons they 
emerged unsystematically and led to another tier of administrative bodies in 
addition to government departments and local authorities.  The lack of coordination 
and unwieldy features prompted descriptions of a “jungle of administrative areas” 
(Chubb, 1992) that was inefficient and unfathomable to the ordinary citizen. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Examples of commercial SSBs include the ESB (electricity supply) and Bord Gais (gas). Non-commerical SSBs 
include Teagasc (agricultural advice and research), Forfás (national policy and advisory board for enterprise, trade, 
science, technology and innovation), Fás (training), Bord Failte (tourism). 
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From this short overview several ‘path dependent’ features of the Irish bureaucracy 
emerge from the institutional framework and the culture in which norms and 
practices were situated and sustained: 
 The incorporation of British norms and tradition through assimilating a 
model of durable democratic institutions and administrative system  
 Adherence to apolitical, impartial, meritocratic principles and the idea of 
public service which manifested distinct modes of handling problems and 
solutions 
 A pragmatic and stable but weak internal logic for dealing with robust state 
development leading to a preponderantly sectoral approach and reliance on 
incremental solutions rather than cultivating reform capacity  
 A brand of political culture characterised by personalism, clientelism, 
authoritarianism, centralism and localism – which could be employed to 
overcome the inadequacies of the system e.g. the brokerage ‘fixer’ role of 
politicians or role of the Catholic Church in ad hoc partnerships  
 
 
State consolidation – optimism and recession 
 
By 1957 the boundaries and philosophy of the central administration seemed 
reasonably settled and were very similar to the institutions set up on the foundation 
of the state (Gaffey 1982: 115).  From the 1930s to the 1950s economic, foreign and 
social policies promoted isolationism and self-sufficiency. This reinforced a 
nationalism that advocated cultural monochromism, social homogeneity and 
political solidarity. The 1937 Constitution gave normative effect to these core values 
of Irish national identity.  In the economy the Irish state displayed a strong 
propensity to the creation of monopolies. Protectionism was the dominant ideology 
between the 1930s and late 1950s. New state sponsored bodies were established in 
agriculture, industry, investment and production, e.g. the Irish Sugar Company 
(1933) and Aer Lingus (1936). The economy did grow marginally between 1945 and 
1949 but the general stagnation of this era left Ireland lagging behind as a poor and 
irrelevant country that did not engage seriously with the modern world. This was 
in marked contrast to the re-emergence of social capitalism across Europe, with 
Marshall Aid providing most states with a much needed boost leading to economic 
growth. In a changed world Ireland made “a series of non-decisions” that in the 
short to medium term were disastrous to the country’s development prospects 
(Garvin, 2004: 4). The political elite seemed to lack the ideas and ability to change 
things, a tendency reinforced by both structural institutional features and the 
distinctive culture. The civil service also preserved the status quo.  Fanning (2008: 
193) asserts that “civil servants no less than priests had to negotiate gingerly 
institutional controls, questions of doctrine and expectations of surrender to 
authority.” Over time the service became composed of principally young men from 
similar backgrounds in rural Ireland, typically educated by the Christian Brothers 
and from families that were unable to afford third level education. They were 
described as intellectually able and hard working, but rather narrowly practical in 
their approach and deeply conservative (see Chubb, 1992). What can be implied 
from this is that the development of the Irish senior civil service reflected neither a 
bureaucratic elite on a par with its British Oxbridge counterparts, or a cohort 
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schooled in the social sciences and the essential techniques for policy making. As a 
consequence policy steering was shaped by the conventions of the organisational 
culture and informal approaches rather than clear strategic planning and rational 
structures   
 
The delay in abandoning the flawed experiment in protectionism was a significant 
policy mistake. Such delays were also evident later on in the failure to invest in 
education earlier and implement policy recommendations to address problems of 
indigenous industry (Sweeney, 2008). By 1955-56 Ireland was experiencing severe 
balance of payments problems and economic recession, high unemployment and 
mass emigration. The political leadership had begun to react as evidenced by the 
decision of the inter-party government in 1949 to establish a stand alone economic 
development agency – the Industrial Development Authority – which had a 
research function and promoted the intensification of economic development under 
directors, not civil servants.  In 1959 Sean Lemass replaced Eamon de Valera as 
leader of Fianna Fáil and Taoiseach and initiated a policy of modernisation, which 
was to lead the State out of economic depression. A key actor in this transition was 
T.K. Whitaker, the new Secretary to the Department of Finance, appointed in 1956.  
Based on a document by Whitaker a Programme for Economic Expansion was 
adopted in 1958. Whitaker’s report marked a move away from the mantra that 
political independence implied economic independence. He argued that a cultural 
change was a precondition of economic development since prior to this point the 
bureaucratic elites in the Department of Finance had perceived their mission as one 
to promote the self sufficiency of the State. The initiatives taken by Whitaker and his 
colleagues mark a critical juncture in the way the administration affirmed its role as 
a nexus between political leadership and the socio-economic development. These 
officials acknowledged that new skills were needed in the public sector (Fanning, 
2008) and bureaucratic inflexibilities needed to be overcome. The adoption of 
planning and applied thinking in the economic areas of government was an 
innovation. It was also unusual that the analysis went through the Cabinet and was 
published in the civil servant’s own name as a personal imprint on policy. The 
programme called for the dismantling of tariffs, the adoption of incentives to 
stimulate industrial investment, government spending to be used to support 
productive enterprises and more support for agriculture. The objective was to 
modernise the Irish economy by refocusing on indigenous industry, the promotion 
of export markets and attraction of inward investment to Ireland. While this official 
leadership reflected a whole new way of thinking about Irish development and 
heralding a new era of state building, the approach has not been without criticism. 
It has been argued that the expanded role of the state to planning did not translate 
into new institutional arrangements within government departments for proactive 
problem solving. Commentators such as Adshead, Kirby and Millar (2008) have 
argued that a lack of ideology continued to prevail and that the problem of late state 
development was narrowly conceived of as an economic problem to the detriment 
of other perspectives.   
 
The Irish economy grew by four per cent per annum from 1960 to 1967, reflecting a 
mix of factors including the government’s new approach and favourable 
international economic conditions arising from the growth of the world economy, 
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especially investment by multi-national corporations (MNCs) in Ireland.  
Consultation with relevant interest groups was acknowledged as a nascent 
corporatism was evident in the establishment of fora such as the National Industrial 
Economic Council (NIEC) in 1963, which became the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) in 1973.  However, socio-economic growth rapidly overtook an 
institutional framework poorly adapted to cope with the tasks now demanded of it 
as responsibility for developing and steering the economy necessitated the creation 
of policy making units in departments. In 1969 Ireland’s EEC application was 
revived and Community membership commenced in 1973.  Paradoxically, this 
accession may have posed a greater challenge to the civil and public service than 
the emergence of the independent state. Laffan (1991: 190) argues that the 
adaptation of public administration to EEC membership questioned the capacity of 
the system to cope with the demands of the European policy process and societal 
circumstances. The necessity for reform was recognised by the Taoiseach Sean 
Lemass who had appointed the Public Services Organisation Review Group (Devlin 
Committee) in 1968. The Devlin Committee was charged with reporting on the most 
appropriate administrative structures to devise and implement policies to guide 
state decision making in an era of change. A similar exercise in the UK culminating 
in the Fulton Report 1968 recommended that control of the civil service be removed 
from the Treasury, whereas Devlin concentrated on structures, process 
management and a seeming lack of attention to effective planning. The resulting 
Devlin Report 1969 was the first comprehensive attempt since the Ministers and 
Secretaries Act 1924 to consider how the public sector might be reorganised and 
managed. It analysed the issue of political control and delegation in terms of the 
burden of administrative work falling upon ministers and higher civil servants and 
provided an overall blueprint for change. In particular, two defects were diagnosed 
in the administration - inadequate emphasis on policy making and lack of 
coordination within the service as a whole.  
The Group was particularly critical of the arbitrary way in which new functions of 
government were organised. Structures needed to be rationalised and a new 
division between what must be subject to political direction and control and what 
could be left to more independent units working through agreed systems towards 
defined objectives (Gaffey, 1982: 118). Attempts were made to create a distinct 
policy making section within selected government departments called the 
‘Aireacht’, to identify clearly and separate these functions. Cosmetic progress was 
made on the Devlin recommendations as many higher level civil servants saw no 
need for reform and the political will to push them forward was absent. For the tiny 
but increasing number of politicians and administrators who were promoting 
reform, senior officials as a collective were regarded as an obstacle for development 
(Chubb, 1992: 238). 
 
Clearly necessary reform was not just a question of structures but also of culture, 
ideas and intellectual influences shaping the civil service.  Government 
departments operated like ivory towers in a tightly defined and largely 
homogenous cultural context. Despite the influence of talented individuals like T.K. 
Whitaker, there was no drive or encouragement to re-think the system on behalf of 
its civil servants. For example, Barrington (1974) argued that the civil service was 
too representative of society since “Irish administrators tended to be the children of 
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small farmers, small shopkeepers and the petit bourgeois, not drawn from some 
hereditary or economic elite” (cited in Fanning, 2008: 204). Commentators were 
scathing of the fictional relationship between official advice and policy making 
promoted by civil servants as naïve, misleading and promoting bureaucratic 
inflexibility (ibid). It enshrined a false dichotomy that misrepresented the workings 
of the policy making processes and the activities of the “permanent government”. 
Generally civil servants left ministers without any freedom of choice or ability to 
test the correctness of their advice. Ministers were dependent on the goodwill of 
their officials who were protected from accountability because of their anonymity, 
an impediment to self appraisal.  To counter this, the Department of Public Service 
was established in 1973 to facilitate cultural change in the public service. But the 
role of the Minister and his/her relationship with parliament as envisaged in the 
Westminister-Whitehall model remained basic to the whole structure of 
government and political culture. Between 1973 and 1983 there was largely a gap 
between public policy and government practice. By 1981 a sharply rising debt to 
GNP ratio and a substantial current account balance of payments deficit of nearly 15 
per cent forced a succession of different governments – five between 1981 and 1987 
– to confront the problem. Despite the benefits flowing from EC membership the 
country was facing a crisis in the public finances and a crisis of confidence in the 
capacity of the political system to deal with it. Economic and financial imperatives 
placed public sector reforms very firmly back on the agenda. The Minister of Public 
Service, John Boland, presented a White Paper entitled Serving the Country Better 
(1985) which emphasised the necessity to change the administrative process and 
invoke more attention to management principles and value for money. Although 
these ideas received endorsement from senior politicians, real reform and culture 
change was shelved. In the late 1980s reform became associated with reducing the 
size of the civil service in a period of fiscal rectitude to the neglect of structural and 
operational improvements. The ‘slash and burn’ mentality is illustrated in the 
demise of the Department of Public Service in 1987 when its functions were 
restored to the Department of Finance and a recruitment embargo was introduced. 
One initiative under Garret Fitzgerald’s government from 1982 to 1987, which did 
encourage a shift in culture away from the 19th Century Northcote-Trevelyan 
report influence, was changes to the method of top level promotion. The method of 
promotion changed to abort the damaging appointment by seniority, and from 
within rather than between departments. The top level appointments committee 
(from 1984) takes applications from high calibre personnel across the service for 
vacancies at the secretary general and assistant secretary level.  
 
 
Responding to the Celtic Tiger – modernisation 
 
Despite the benefits of EU membership, Ireland continued to exhibit the 
characteristics of a latecomer to economic development at the end of the 1980s. 
Ireland was compared to the East Asian developmental states that faced obstacles to 
which an active state with a “strategic planning capacity” was critical (O’Malley, 
1989: 237).  In a report for NESC in 1992 Lars Mjoset, a Norwegian sociologist, 
reached the conclusion that Ireland had a very poor national system of innovation.  
What was implied here was not just technical innovation but a broad capacity to 
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initiate and manage change (cited by McCarthy, 2006: 80). Despite this critique of 
the capacity of the system, Ireland managed to take advantage of EU membership 
and market access to pursue national economic policies that proved successful in 
promoting economic growth and restoring confidence in the Irish economy for 
investors by the early 1990s. The State was also stimulated by significant financial 
transfers from Europe at a time that coincided with a Europe-wide recession (1991-
93) thereby ensuring that Ireland received a boost from EU funds opportunely.  
 
Although not a concrete reform of the modus operandi of the civil service per se, a 
new departure to the model of policy making in Ireland is evident with the 
development of negotiated governance. In 1987 the newly elected Fianna Fáil 
government adopted a social partnership approach shaped by state deliberation, 
testing responses, negotiation and implementation with the major social partners. 
Taking a longitudinal view, an evolution from tripartism evident from the 1960s 
and 1970s to partnership after 1987 is evident in policy content, process and 
institutions. This model has endured as the route through which the directions to 
principal economic and social policy are set. A NESC strategy report is the main 
input into the negotiations between partners lead from the Department of Taoiseach 
and chaired by the Secretary General. An important feature of Ireland’s system of 
social partnership has been the widening of the organisations involved in the 
process over time to include voluntary and community groups as well as key 
unions and economic actors. Although shaped by its own unique features this 
model reflects the challenges of contemporary governance through leading via 
complex networks as opposed to extending the ‘command and control’ 
management characteristics of traditional public administration.   
 
However, while participation in the EU and the initiation of the social partnership 
process precipitated reform and innovation, this was not mirrored in all 
departmental structures and horizontal coordination. By the mid 1990s there was 
little evidence within the Irish system of the more pronounced aspects of 
managerialism implemented in other Westminster type systems under the banner 
of new public management (Connaughton, 2008). Many aspects of the human 
resource and financial management systems were regarded as outdated and 
unsuited to current needs and developments. The requirement to focus more 
concretely on the interdependence of the economy and politico-administrative 
system, public and private sectors was palpable since the organisational and 
institutional mechanisms with the capacity to identify and mediate these changes 
were not in place. To a large degree the bureaucracy remained rooted in the early 
traditions and its own internal logic, as opposed to adapting and modernising with 
the times. The Irish case differed, however, from several of its Westminster cousins 
in that a politicised attack on bureaucracy did not occur during the late 
1970s/1980s.  The impetus for change in Ireland occurred later in comparison to its 
Westminster cousins and in contrast came from officials and specifically from the 
concerns of senior civil servants about the performance of the system over which 
they presided.  The political leadership supported this initiative and in 1994 the 
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds launched a process to underpin an emphasis on 
management change called the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI). The 
provision of better services, greater efficiency and value for money by public bodies 
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to the broad range of customers they serve was a central tenet of the programme. In 
tandem the strategy promoted a shift from a culture of secretness underpinned by 
the Official Secrets Act 1911 to a culture based on openness. In all it was felt that 
there should be more attention to features of the model of corporate governance 
within Irish public administration and that changes needed to be addressed within 
the legislative framework to underpin responsibility and accountability in the civil 
service. 
 
In March 1995 the then Government requested a coordinating group of secretaries 
to review existing systems for making decisions, allocating responsibility and 
ensuring accountability in the Irish Civil Service. Recommendations, albeit within 
the thinking and principles that had informed earlier attempts to reform, were 
made for a set of mechanisms mandating change. To a large degree these officials 
zoned in on public management reform processes and outcomes in New Zealand 
and Australia while taking into account the likely success of transferring such 
practices.  Delivering Better Government (DBG) was published in 1996 and set out a 
strategic framework for change, specifically within the civil service but with the 
intention of broadening the process to the wider public service in order to fully 
contribute to national development. The central precept of this report was the 
promise of greater openness and accountability, a mission of quality customer 
service, efficient and fair operation of simplified regulations i.e. the need for civil 
servants to do a number of things better. 
 
Greater attention to the features of corporate governance, however, implied 
necessary amendment to the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924. This was addressed 
by the Public Services Management Act 1997 which, drawing from the New Zealand 
experience, set out to enhance the management effectiveness and transparency of 
departments and provide for increased accountability of civil servants through the 
setting of key objectives and outputs, strategy statements and business plans. The 
crux of this legislation was the intention to allocate authority and accountability for 
service delivery to those who provide the service, develop a performance 
management culture and a results oriented approach to decision making. In terms 
of roles and responsibilities the role of the secretary general as an accounting officer 
is outlined in section 4 of the Act and while the principle of managerial 
accountability is strongly promoted, it is questionable as to whether it is balanced 
with the constitutional requirement of governmental accountability to parliament. 
The Irish model continues to be based on the principle that ministers are collectively 
accountable for the performance of the functions assigned to their departments and 
secretaries general are accountable to their ministers (see MacCarthaigh, 2005; 
Connaughton, 2006). To a large degree public management reform in the context of 
‘letting the managers manage’ does not alleviate the complexities of these 
relationships at the apex of the administration or necessarily sharpen accountability. 
Rather it would appear to complicate rather than clarify them when controversy 
arises. The framework has more potential to be successful at middle layers of 
management where designated units remain (principally, but not exclusively) 
under the control of departmental managers and in which information systems are 
linked to a new culture of audit. 
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Embedding the strategic management process in the day to day management and 
operation of government organisations is overseen administratively by an 
Implementation Group of Secretaries General and a Public Service Modernisation 
Division that works in close co-operation with the Department of Finance. It is 
evident that a modernisation of process and procedure has occurred since 15 years 
ago regulatory reform did not exist, only a limited number of departments would 
have produced a business plan based upon a statement of strategy or regarded the 
public as customers - let alone establish customer charters (Connaughton, 2008). It 
has been acknowledged though that progress has been made under the more 
outward facing themes and not on the more technical corporate support services 
(PA Consulting, 2002). This has been remedied by some advancement on the latter 
with the Performance Management and Development System (PMDS), further 
delegation of financial authority to individual ministers with agreed parameters 
and criteria, and the introduction of accruals accounting. A series of OECD 
economic surveys have evaluated progress in attempts to obtain better value for 
money from public expenditure in line with the modernisation programme 
objectives. They point to systematic, steady but incremental reform in some areas 
and new instruments such as Value for Money guidelines on appraisal and cost-
benefit analysis of capital projects, Organisational Review Programme and 
Efficiency Reviews to maximise administrative savings (OECD, 2008). 
 
The SMI remained the bedrock of the modernisation programme until 2008 and the 
findings of an external evaluation signalled that the civil service was better 
managed but that implementation was incomplete (PA Consulting, 2002). The 
overall ‘buy in’ of the civil service and change in culture does need to be 
questioned. In many ways reform is embraced by the bureaucratic elites but its 
impact on the awareness of the lower grades is questionable. A survey on 
communicating change and modernisation in the civil service in January 2003 found 
that overall awareness of SMI initiatives was generally quite  poor, with a quarter of 
civil servants (mainly middle and lower grades) unable to name any reform 
initiative to implement change in the previous five years. Many have not 
internalised or understood many of the key reform initiatives. 
 
 
Taking stock and moving forward  
 
In 2007 the Irish government requested the OECD to undertake a review of the 
public service as a whole. The OECD was given two tasks: first, to benchmark the 
public service in Ireland against other comparable countries, and to identify 
appropriate measures to compare the productivity and effectiveness of the Irish 
system, or discrete elements of it, against comparable international best practice. 
Secondly, to make recommendations as to future directions for public service 
reform, to support the Irish Government's drive for delivery of best quality services 
to the citizen within existing resources and contribute to sustainable national 
competitiveness. 
 
The review was published in 2008 and called for a renewal of public service reform. 
The report argued that a decade of reform had resulted in progress but in 
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uncoordinated development. It affirmed that introducing strategic vision, greater 
performance review and an integrated senior executive service was necessary 
(OECD, 2008). The review also indicated that despite major increases in public 
sector employment and expenditure, public disbursements remained small as a 
percentage of total GDP in comparison to other OECD countries and generally 
reflected a typical ‘catching up’ process.  What the recommendations appear to 
indicate is that modernisation is evident but an overall paradigm shift is not in 
relation to the culture and workings of many aspects of the service. The injection of 
technical engineering through the application of more business like techniques 
arguably can only go so far and does not change the fundamentals of a system or 
threaten settled positions and interests. The recommendation of a senior executive 
service would imply that senior managers must do more to drive change 
downwards through the civil service, encourage mobility and appropriate skills 
deployment in addition to fostering a progressive culture amongst the bureaucratic 
elite themselves. 
 
Following publication of the review, the Taoiseach announced the establishment of 
a task force to develop an action plan for the public service. The task force was 
asked to prepare a comprehensive framework for renewal of the public service, 
which takes into account the analysis and conclusions of the OECD, as well as the 
lessons to be drawn from the experience of reform. It published Transforming Public 
Services – Citizen Centred, Performance Focused in November 2008 with 
recommendations for a more integrated public service framework. The report’s 
sentiments appear to echo the objectives of the original SMI/DBG in many ways 
but encompass evidence of some learning accrued from that original process. The 
report attempts to articulate a way forward and embed a greater performance 
culture within public administration. However, the task force was completing its 
work in significantly different circumstances. The challenge now facing the public 
service is not just to accentuate its performance but also to assist the political 
leadership face new domestic economic and financial realities exacerbated by global 
recession. While the initial downturn in activity in 2008 was driven by the sharp 
decline in the Irish property and construction sectors, it broadened into a marked 
weakening of domestic demand that is being significantly amplified by the fall in 
export demand, reduced tax receipts (higher borrowing requirements) and high 
unemployment. The Irish economy shrank further in 2009 with projections that 
GDP and GNP declined by 7 per cent and 11.3 per cent respectively (Central Bank, 
2010) whereas the standardised unemployment rate rose to 12.6 per cent in 
February 2010 (CSO, 2010). 
 
It is obvious that the public sector is not responsible for what has happened in 
Ireland or internationally in the banking sector. Nor can it insulate the State from 
the effects of the global downturn, but a renewed focus on public sector rationale 
and effectiveness has returned. The OECD report may well have highlighted the 
relatively modest size of the public sector but this was during a period when there 
was a healthy private sector to underpin it. In 2009 day to day public expenditure 
reached its highest share of GNP since 1986. In the period prior to the budget 
measures announced in April and December 2009, public sector earnings were 
considered to be higher than in the private sector. A sharp relative increase in 
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public sector wages occurred following the first Public Service Benchmarking Body 
(PSBB) report which recommended an overall increase in public service pay costs of 
8.9 per cent (PSBB, 2002). These pay increases were tied to the elimination of many 
inefficient working practices, such as the system of linking pay in different parts of 
the public sector, and a greater volume of output. In practice, progress is hard to 
evaluate: although reports were published that show compliance with the agreed 
changes in working practices, no evidence was made available to demonstrate that 
better outcomes had been achieved and changes in working practices clearly 
apparent.   
 
Faced with need to retrieve sharp loss in competitiveness and without the option of 
using the exchange rate to do so, nominal wage cuts were considered essential 
(O’Leary, 2009).  Cutting the number of public servants may be necessary and it 
would be much more preferable that such a measure be implemented as part of a 
programme of intelligent public sector reform.  The principal response has been a 
range of blunt instruments introduced to swiftly decrease the size of the public 
sector pay bill in the form of an income levy, pension levy and pay cuts specific to 
public sector workers.  In December 2008 the government established ‘An Bord Snip 
Nua’ or officially the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes (SGPSNEP) to review whether resources are deployed effectively 
across the public service. Its report published in July 2009 recommended €5.3 billion 
in potential savings, including 17,300 public service job cuts and a 5 per cent drop in 
social welfare (Department of Finance, 2009).  The mini-budget in April 2009 
announced an early retirement scheme where workers will not be replaced unless 
sanctioned by the Department of Finance. The Minister also ordered a review of 
top-level public sector pay rates and introduced a service wide employment 
embargo. While senior public servants have voiced the imperative to reinstate and 
respect the traditional values of public service rather than concentrate on bonuses 
and performance related pay (McCarthy, 2006), the cost and perceived inefficiency 
of the public sector in a weakening economy has led to more intensified negative 
commentary. The public sector does have areas of inefficiency; it can be slow to 
engage in structural reform, and often management skills may be poor or absent. 
But the mantra that “the private sector does it better” appears harder to promote 
when viewed alongside the recklessness and unethical behaviour of representatives 
of the banking sector. What has been illustrated by the financial crisis, however, is 
the lack of specific economic expertise in the Department of Finance. The input and 
skills of economic specialists and other professionals capable of taking a strategic 
view needs to be acquired to curb the perceived conservative, short term, cost 
cutting mentality of the Department of Finance. A capacity review of the 
Department in July 2009 highlighted areas where it needs to address reform and re-
organisation in order to perform more effectively. The recommendations included 
the development of more enhanced policy analysis skills and greater attention to 
specialist management training tailored to the civil service as opposed to generic 
management skills training (Department of Finance, 2009: 53).  Access to specialist 
skills, including economic forecasting, was a specific recommendation. An audit of 
the number of qualifications held by staff of all grades in various disciplines at 
diploma, primary degree and masters level indicated that only twelve out of a total 
of 514 qualifications were in economic policy analysis/policy studies (ibid, p.59). 
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Despite the other range of skills available the number of economists within the 
Department is not sufficient and this expertise should be available in-house as well 
as procured from or triangulated by external experts. In the past the administrative 
side of the civil service has opposed the recognition of professional grades (such as 
economist), thus precluding such specialists from a normal career trajectory in the 
Department (FitzGerald, 2009). In light of the current vulnerability of the Irish 
economy, appropriate expertise of this nature can not be compensated by the 
collective and institutional civil service memory and the review acknowledged that 
the Department should be more pro-actively engaged with strategic issues. 
 
 
Continuity or Change? 
 
Ireland came to statehood with a very traditional understanding of the role of the 
state as a night watchman state (McCarthy, 2006). As a small state on the fringe of 
Europe, Ireland has undergone enormous transformations since the beginning of 
the 1990s – economically, socially, culturally, politically and environmentally. Up to 
2007 commentators referred Ireland as “a place that other countries want to 
emulate, particularly those of Eastern Europe” (Kitchin and Bartley, 2007). Ireland’s 
status as a role model is now far more questionable as the country remains in the 
throes of a serious crisis. In the public finances area, it is critical that firm and 
decisive action is sustained to reverse a major deterioration and stave off a 
worsening of the general government deficit. The sharp descent in the robustness of 
the fiscal position triggered criticism at EU level and a concern in international 
markets about the scale of the exchequer financing needs in difficult market 
conditions. The preservation of confidence in the Irish economy required restoring 
order to the public finances a matter of urgency. The institution of the civil service 
has an important role to play in assisting the political leadership with these ongoing 
challenges.  
 
This discussion has attempted to articulate the core characteristics of the central 
bureaucracy and provide some insight into attempts over time to introduce reform 
and stimulate a more strategic policy making capacity.  With reference to Christian 
and Laegreid’s (2001) distinction, Ireland conforms more generally to the model of 
the ‘sovereign state’ and with reference to Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004: 100) 
typology - a ‘moderniser’ and advocate of the Neo-Weberian State rather than the 
NPM state. This embodies a belief in the distinctiveness of public service but 
acknowledges the need for fairly fundamental changes in the way the 
administrative system is organised. EU membership and an increased 
interconnection with the global economic system have provided a catalyst for this 
modernisation.  Although regarded as a late developer, given the policy decisions 
of the 1930s to 1950s, the system is now more open to examining alternative 
methods of addressing problems and in lesson learning from further a field.    
Ireland’s reform experience has been different to other Westminster type systems in 
that ideologically driven, radical reform has not been a central plank of its 
programme unlike practices in the UK or New Zealand. It reflects a ‘top down’ 
process of largely generic management restructurings and processes initiated in the 
1990s and born from the necessity to adapt to the exigencies of EU membership and 
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economic challenges. What is also different from some other states is that political 
drivers were not instrumental in instigating the contemporary reforms (even if their 
support was necessary). Rather the modernisation of the administration was 
motivated by the elite perceptions of senior civil servants benefiting from the 
hindsight of service and their information networks within the EU and OECD.   
 
In terms of a historical and sociological institutionalism it is evident that the central 
bureaucracy has retained many of the core features embedded in the institutional 
framework in the early decades of independence and these have mediated change. 
Kissane (1995) has commented that the development of Irish political culture 
reflects the pre-modern durability of Irish institutions due to the incorporation of 
that culture’s norms. The centrality of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ to the 
normative approach results in a set of behavioural expectations for individuals in 
positions within the institution and then reinforces behaviour that is appropriate for 
the role and sanctions behaviour that is inappropriate (Peters 2005:31). In the Irish 
case an electoral system based on transferring votes between candidates (in many 
cases of the same party), trends towards coalition government and social 
partnership perpetuate a consensual political culture biased towards conservative 
and incremental policy development. The role of the Minister and his/her 
relationship with parliament as envisaged in the Westminster Whitehall model also 
remains basic to the whole structure of government and has become part of the 
administrative/management culture as it affects the civil service and how it 
operates. The values of impartiality and pragmatism remain intrinsic to behaviour 
and the self image of senior civil servants and it takes considerable political will to 
drive changes to the policy status quo.  The Department of the Taoiseach has 
undertaken a greater co-ordination role but the imprint of the Department of 
Finance and its culture remains significant. Recommendations from the past and the 
present remind us of how much and how little the system has changed. The Devlin 
Report noted in 1969 that “the system permits the less competent and energetic 
officer to get by” and this feature is echoed in the comments of the OECD review 
that “there is little evidence of detailed performance dialogue in Ireland” (OECD, 
2008). The latter phrased clearly in contemporary management discourse but the 
sentiments are similar. 
 
It would appear that internal logic of the service has been a major influence in 
enhancing and also not enhancing the strategic capacity of the state. It is 
acknowledged that the civil and public service has tended to be good at responding 
to initiatives when necessary, but “weak at putting them forward or shaping them 
at the outset” (Callanan, 2007: 37). The authors of the OECD review advocating an 
integrated public service has urged that the bureaucracy “look beyond its own 
internal logic to adopt that of the citizen and embrace new ways of looking at old 
problems” (2008:36). The review notes that public service reform in Ireland has not 
been based on any particular ideology or philosophy of reform but rather has been 
based on pragmatism. This institutional feature has endured and is possibly 
reinforced by the career system which can make senior managers cautious and 
resistant to change. Reform initiatives are seeking to address the inflexibility of 
mobility between or even within departments and the deployment of human 
resources across the service. The system could learn from initiatives in the 
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Netherlands and Finland seeking to develop the competencies and career planning 
of top managers in the civil service. The development of more effective leadership 
capacities and the injection of more specialist expertise would buoy up the strategic 
capacity of the service.  What is evident from the Irish experience of central 
government reform is that the commitment of a relatively small cadre of senior 
officials is a valuable asset for the Irish State. But the capacity to consider longer 
term issues proactively is more modest and rooted in institutional routines. The 
Irish experience bears parallels to the evidence from other Western public sectors 
that institutional cultures cannot be rapidly transformed.   
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